The international relations are navigating perilous waters of increasing conflicts and unprecedented uncertainty. As all crises, this represents both a risk and an opportunity, if one is ready to face the challenges.

The international economic and monetary system had already been evolving in the last few decades through increasing tensions and contradictions, which became more and more acute and difficult to sustain. Basically, interdependence was left to increase – both in terms of globalization of trade due to dispersed value chains and increasing capital mobility, in the context of a digital transition that allowed real-time capital movements – without providing the governance infrastructure to manage such worldwide interdependence.

The recent four major shocks that hit the global economy (Covid-19, with the upsetting of global value chains; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis; the resurgence of inflation, both cost-driven and speculation-induced; the advent of protectionism in the heart of the global economic system with the advent of Trump) are now exposing all the contradictions that have been accumulating since decades.

At least since 1997, when the USA (with the complacency of the IMF) frustrated the Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund (Masini 2024), a regional tool to avoid domino effects in the East-Asian currency crisis, while China was negotiating its accession to the WTO. Since then, we have seen a skyrocketing accumulation of reserves (in US Treasury bonds) as a cushion against potential sudden capital flights and the need to recur to the IMF, with its heavy conditional lending. Hence the growing of a paradox: savings from the rest of the world have been financing US expenditures, both investment and consumption. This paradox is particularly striking in the case of low-income countries, which were bound to buy $-denominated T-bonds for precautionary reasons, given their vulnerable financial position, instead of spending for growth and social protection.

Such paradox could survive only thanks to the credibility and recognized legitimacy of the dollar to play a hegemonic role; and of the US-denominated T-bond to be the safe asset par eccellence. Which could in turn rely on the US playing the role of guarantor of free trade and a stable currency and its function as de facto Lender of Last Resort (via the currency swaps of the FED) and Consumer of Last Resort of the US Federal Government during major systemic crises (as in 2008-09).

Attempts at fixing some flaws of the international monetary system with a new international monetary conference, a sort of Bretton Woods 2 (as was repeatedly called for in those years), based on overcoming the Triffin Dilemma (as the speech by the Governor of the People Bank of China Zhou made clear in March 2009) were frustrated by USA (and the whole G7).

Hence the emergence of the BRICS (June 2009), the multilateralization of the Chiang Mai Initiative and the establishment of a first-line regional safety net (2011) and the recent trans-national payment system in renminbi (2025).

Such evolution shows that we are heading towards a new bipolar world, with a weaponization of currencies and financial infrastructures that needs to be resisted, as a new confrontation between blocks would hinder the production of global public goods that are increasingly becoming crucial for the survival of humankind: decarbonization and the struggle against climate change, a peaceful resolution of conflicts, universal access to primary resources, regulation of the digital transition towards artificial intelligence and the new technologies, etc. All unanimously shared needs by the citizens of the world, that require global collective action.

Although these issues are usually left to top-level strategic games between a few major global players, we believe that the peculiar situation we are currently experiencing leaves some room for manoeuvre to bottom-up political action.

First, the emergence of awareness concerning the global nature of a few but key public goods opens the opportunity for a narrative pushing for the establishment of mechanisms and institutions for the provision of such global collective goods. Such narratives might serve to collect popular calls for more practical action, upscaling initiatives such as the Fridays for Future that emerged a few years ago and should not be wasted.

This would also enhance the possibility to strengthen the process towards multilateralism, through greater regional integration in all major areas of the world: Africa, Central and Latina America, South-East Asia, etc. All existing regional initiatives should be encouraged, with a few concrete proposals such as the establishment, for example, in both Africa and Central and Latin America, of regional safety nets, comparable to the one existing within the Chian Mai Initiative.

Secondly, the impossibility of the renminbi to be a genuine, alternative safe-asset to the USD-denominated T-bond, given its obscure capital market and poor transparency, provides an opportunity for the euro to acquire a greater role in international payments and reserves. This would require the completion of the banking union and single capital market, its increasing deepness and liquidity, on all yield/maturity combinations, and the increasing quantity of euro-denominated T-bonds, not fragmented in national issuers but centralized at the supranational level for high-quality and high-return investment projects. From this point of view, however smart, proposals to revive (Blanchard 2025) the blue-bond proposal (Delpla and Weizsäcker 2010) are not heading into the right direction, as they would only consolidate past debt, instead of facing the current challenges. We should also acknowledge here the resistance of national governments to allow trans-national mergers and acquisitions that would rationalize the banking system and make it more competitive in a global market.

This would require a political and intellectual shift away from standard economic policy orientation in Europe, as availability to lose part of its monetary sovereignty sacrificing domestic objectives to international needs would be necessary, possibly in cooperation with the other major global players, as well as issuing more supranational collective euro-denominated bonds for collective regional projects and playing the lender of last resort in case of global systemic crises.

An increasing international role of the euro, though, should not aim to replace the dollar as a principal reserve currency in the world, with the risk of replicating the contradictions that have been characterizing the dollar hegemony; nor should we aim at a multi-currency system, that might bring about even greater financial instability. A greater role of the euro should only aim, in the short-term, at showing that an alternative to hegemonic stability is possible. While, in the medium-term, the objective should be enlarging the role of SDRs (the only multicurrency asset) as “principal reserve asset”, as the Articles of Agreement of

the International Monetary Fund state (art. XXII). This would require a collective responsibility to coordinate broad monetary policies between the major global players, both in normal times, to manage macroeconomic surveillance and financial stability, and open the possibility, in the middle-term, to a revision of the SDR basket allowing for accession of regional currencies and, in a longer-term, the eventual transformation of SDRs into a genuine supranational currency, not based on national ones, issued to finance global public goods.

We are now experiencing an extraordinary opportunity to struggle for: a strengthening of regional integration processes, especially in Europe, where a constitutional reform of the EU would increase its international actorness; and for a reform of the international monetary system to deliver on the provision of crucial global public goods in a multipolar, multilayered logic. As academics, think-tanks, and civil society organizations, we are all called to exploit such unprecedented window of opportunity; we should not miss it.

References

Blanchard O. 2025. Now is the time for Eurobonds: A specific proposal, Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 30, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/now-time-eurobonds-specific-proposal.

Delpla J. and von Weizsäcker J. 2010. The Blue Bond Proposal, Bruegel Policy Brief, 3, May 6.

Masini F. 2024. Reappraising Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund, Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 91(3), 367-392.

A European solution for French nuclear weapons

In an interview on the TF1 television network on May 13, referring to France’s nuclear arsenal (the Force de frappe), the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, took a step forward from his speech at the “École de guerre” in February 2020. Five years ago, Macron hoped for the development of “a strategic dialogue with our European partners willing to discuss the role of French nuclear deterrence within the framework of collective security.” During the interview, Macron announced that he had initiated talks with Germany and Poland to consider whether and how France could extend nuclear deterrence to the entire European continent. In particular, Macron said he was ready to open discussions with the Europeans on the possibility of stationing French nuclear weapons on their territory.

This is an important development, but before commenting on it, it is worth clarifying a point that recurs frequently when discussing equipping Europe with a nuclear deterrence capability. It is argued that this deterrence should be based on the nuclear capabilities of France and Britain. This alternative is entirely theoretical, as the only autonomous nuclear arsenal controlled by a European country is that of France. The British nuclear arsenal is integrated into the U.S. nuclear arsenal and cannot be used without U.S. consent (unless British security is at risk). The four British submarines are equipped with American-made Trident ballistic missiles and employ nuclear warheads that are also American-made.

In his interview with TF1, Macron also clarified the conditions under which France is willing to place French nuclear weapons on the territory of other European countries. Interested countries would have to participate in financing the French nuclear umbrella, and ultimate control over its deployment would remain in the hands of the President of the French Republic. The possibility of European countries participating in the financing of France’s nuclear arsenal is an issue that dates back to 2022 when, a few months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s former finance minister Wolfgang Schëuble declared that, in exchange for the deterrence extended to Germany, Germany would have to help fund it.

This aspect of the problem, however, should be seen in the broader context of the level of military spending to be borne by European countries, which should not be set by the U.S., but by the EU, in agreement with European countries and not on the basis of a single percentage of GDP, but differentiated country by country. A country with nuclear weapons and a stronger naval force than other countries, such as France, is likely to incur a higher level of spending. Other countries, smaller in size and located in central Europe, have armed forces that require a lower level of spending. Provision should therefore be made to compensate countries willing to spend more than the European average via the European budget.

The most sensitive point raised by Macron is, of course, the fact that the final word on the use of the nuclear deterrent remains in the hands of the President of the French Republic. In the short term, no other solution is conceivable. In the medium to long term, it will be necessary to opt for a permanent solution at the European level: one perspective on which one might begin to reflect may be offered by the experience of American Federalism.

From the outset, the military structure of the U.S. had two levels: the federal level, with limited armed forces, and the state level, based on state militias, which, until the beginning of the 20th century comprised the majority of the American military structure. State constitutions have gradually included a provision that the Governor of the State “shall be Commander‑in‑Chief of the military forces of the State, except when they are called into the active service of the United States. ” Although, historically, the

provision is one that many states have struggled to comply with, it may provide a model for the extension and use of the French nuclear umbrella on the European continent. In other words, the French Constitution would specify that “the person in charge of the nuclear force is the President of the French Republic, until such time as the European Council decides to make use of it.” Symmetrically, similar wording would need to be included in the European Constitutional Treaty.

The problems raised by such a provision are beyond the scope of this article, which seels solely to put forward an institutional solution as a starting point for reflection. To some aspects, however, consideration can be given, the first of which concerns the world order the EU intends to pursue. It is widely believed that the EU is the only political community , albeit out of self-interest, capable of defending and supporting multilateral institutions to safeguard a world order based on shared rules. Hence, the provision set out here for the permanent availability of the French nuclear arsenal is preferable (not only for reasons of speed) to a solution involving equipping the EU with its own nuclear arsenal, requiring the development of R&D and the direct production of a nuclear arsenal by the EU.

Such a choice would give the wrong signal to the rest of the world, bringing the EU into the arms race, which in 2024, according to SIPRI statistics, recorded worldwide arms at a record high of $2.7 trillion at current prices. The suggestion here is based on recognition that nuclear weapons are a deterrent against a possible aggressor, without resorting to what justifiably would be seen as nuclear proliferation. In essence, it would be a kind of “realistic pacifism” (or “peaceful realism”) inspired by the Gorbachevian idea of a “defensive defence.”

The second aspect concerns another currently held view that security and foreign policy go together, and cannot be separated. Again, it should be remembered that the EU will become a federal, not a united, institutional system. Therefore, it does not follow that a common security policy requires a common foreign policy. Strictly speaking, a common European security policy, including the use, if necessary, of nuclear weapons, in the manner set out here, can be decided independently of a common foreign policy. Necessary – this certainly – is the common assessment of external threats to the European political community against which the EU is to defend itself. The common view of the threats to European security is the indispensable step for the activation of the “double-button” procedure, i.e. the same procedure currently in force within the Atlantic Alliance, in this case, however, placed in a democratic framework.

Such a decision in a political community comprising historically established nation-states cannot be made by a simple majority vote: it should be, if not unanimous, then passed by an overwhelming majority of EU countries, utilising the constructive abstention mechanism set out in EU treaties for countries that do not agree with the list of identified threats, or alternatively the procedure chosen to override the Hungarian veto on sanctions against Russia (essentially, a “coffee break” for the dissenting country). Needless to say, once threats to the EU were identified, these assessments would be put to a vote in the European Parliament.

The final aspect is what European institution should have the power to “push the button” in the event of a nuclear threat from third countries. Realistically, the only institution able to assume such a power is the European Council – responsible for analysing, evaluating and establishing the credibility of the threats – in the person of its President, who may also act according to a French initiative. These suggestions require more in-depth evaluation but the time for this is running out.

A proposal for European Union

The issue of debt financing for the Union’s expenditure is quite complex, as the global economy faces significant challenges stemming from various factors, including geopolitical tensions, ecological and digital transitions, and the disruptions caused by the new American administration. In this intricate context, the European Union, as outlined in the Draghi Report on competitiveness¹, requires a minimum additional annual investment ranging from EUR 750 to 800 billion euros to achieve the objectives specified in the report. This amount represents approximately 4.4% to 4.7% of the EU’s GDP in 2023. Furthermore, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has underscored the urgent need to enhance security policies aimed at protecting the Union. According to estimates from Bruegel. “European defense spending will have to increase substantially from the current level of about 2 percent of GDP. An initial assessment suggests an increase by about €250 billion annually (to around 3.5 percent of GDP) is warranted in the short term”².

Ultimately, a realistic estimate of the annual cost for producing European public goods is approximately 1 trillion euros per year. The Draghi Report indicates that planned expenditures for security are around 50 billion euros. By adding another 200 billion euros earmarked for defense, to reach the level hypothesized by Bruegel, this brings us to the extensive total of 1 trillion euros annually. According to the report, it is generally estimated that about 20% of the total investments required will need to be financed through public resources. This figure is likely underestimated, particularly in the initial phase, as private investments will require incentives from public funds. Consequently, the additional resources needed each year in the European budget could be estimated to range between 200 and 250 billion euros. This is a figure that appears absolutely out of reach for the current finances of the Union. It is therefore a question of identifying new resources to support these investments.

The first way is represented by the issuance of European bonds that could also favour the creation of a safe asset for countries that are trying to escape from their dependence on the dollar, such as China and other states in the South of the world. But, even in this case, the sums necessary for debt servicing will have to be made available to the budget (in the case of servicing the emissions carried out under NGEU, the Commission estimates that 30 billion euros are already needed annually). In this perspective, also taking into account the socially imperative need to reduce the inequalities that the recent evolution of fiscal policy has created in the distribution of income, it is necessary to seriously evaluate the possibility of introducing a form of taxation of the super-rich resident within the Union, with a tax that could generate a double dividend: on the one hand, generating the resources necessary for the production of European public goods and, at the same time, ensuring the production of social services essential to avoid a further widening of inequalities within European society.

In the post-war period, there were significant global improvements in income distribution. However, inequality, after accounting for taxes and transfers, has steadily increased over the last two decades. This trend is largely attributed to a less redistributive fiscal policy, characterized by a substantial reduction in the progressivity of income tax. According to data collected by Gabriel Zucman³, wealth inequality in the United States has dramatically risen since 1980. The top 1% of earners held about 40% of the nation’s wealth in 2016, compared to 25-30% in 1980. A similar trend is observable worldwide, with the concentration of wealth increasing. For instance, in China, Europe, and the United States combined, the wealth share of the richest 1% has grown from 28% in 1980 to 33% today, while the share of the bottom 75% stands at approximately 10%.

The accumulation of a large fortune results from personal ability and commitment, but it is also facilitated by the social environment and the availability of public goods. The introduction of a progressive wealth tax should ensure that after deducting the amounts paid for wealth and inheritance taxes—funding the production of essential public goods that support individual efforts—there remains a residual amount for rewarding the activity and commitment that led to the accumulation of wealth. This remaining amount can then be distributed based on individual choices, whether passed on to heirs, used for social utility, or allocated to support activities of collective interest. Therefore, implementing a wealth tax would strengthen social cohesion and enhance the potential for growth in a society with reduced inequalities.

In Europe, as the need for spending increases to support the ecological and digital “double transition,” as well as measures to ensure the continent’s defence and the security of its citizens, it is becoming increasingly difficult to raise the tax burden on taxpayers. Meanwhile, the super-rich are able to pay taxes at a rate that is virtually non-existent. According to the Global Tax Evasion Report 2024, prepared by the EU Tax Observatory⁴, there are numerous opportunities for the wealthy to evade various forms of income taxation, resulting in effective tax rates of only 0% to 0.5% of their total wealth. In contrast, income taxes for ordinary citizens, who cannot exploit similar elusion tactics, range between 20% and 50%. This disparity is increasingly politically unsustainable. However, some progress has been made with the establishment of new forms of international cooperation, including an automatic and multilateral exchange of banking information that has been in effect since 2017 and is now applied by over 100 countries in 2023. Additionally, a historic international agreement for a global minimum tax on multinational corporations was approved by more than 140 countries and territories in 2021.

To address this situation, four countries—Germany, Spain, Brazil, and South Africa—recently proposed introducing a wealth tax during a meeting of the Finance Ministers of the G20 nations. This proposed tax would have a rate of 2% on the approximately 3,000 billionaires worldwide. According to the Global Tax Evasion Report 2024, implementing a global minimum tax on billionaires at this rate could generate around $250 billion in annual tax revenues. This revenue would help reduce inequalities and provide public funds for essential interventions needed in the aftermath of the pandemic, the climate crisis, and military conflicts in Europe and the Middle East.

Regarding the situation within the European Union, the aforementioned Report estimates that the 499 European billionaires – defined as taxpayers with an average individual wealth of 4.85 billion euros – enjoy a total wealth of 2,418 billion euros (about 13% of the Union’s GDP, which amounts to 18,590 billion in 2023), and is higher than Italy’s GDP, equal to 2,128 billion euros. The wealth related tax that could be introduced at the Union level should prescribe a rate of 2%⁵. The amount owed to the tax authorities by each ultra-rich taxpayer should reach at least this level, including what has already been paid for personal income tax purposes, generating revenue of 48.4 billion. The aim of such a wealth tax is to ensure – similar to what was defined at the OECD regarding the 15% rate for minimum taxation of multinational companies – that the super-rich pay a minimum rate overall compared to their income. Consequently, the amount of personal taxes that the super-

rich currently pay (estimated at 6 billion, with an average rate of 0.25%) would be subtracted from the wealth tax revenue. Ultimately, the additional revenue from a 2% tax proportional to wealth would amount to 42.4 billion (approximately 30% of the payments entered in the 2024 budget of the Union, which total 142.6 billion), with an impact on each taxpayer of about 85 million.

This proposed minimum tax should be viewed not as a wealth tax, but rather as a mechanism to enhance the income tax system. A billionaire already paying the equivalent of 2% of their wealth in income tax would not pay anything additional. However, billionaires who currently contribute less than 2% of their wealth in income tax would have their individual payments increased to match this 2% threshold based on the value of their assets. This approach differs from a traditional 2% wealth tax for billionaires, which would be an additional charge on top of the income tax owed. In contrast, the minimum tax suggested here is simply an adjustment to their existing income tax payments.

To assess the economic implications of this measure, it is important to highlight that the effective tax rate for billionaires in the European Union is currently less than 0.3% of their wealth. Additionally, the Zucman Report estimates that the average pre-tax return on wealth for very high net-worth individuals has been around 7.5% per year (after adjusting for inflation) over the past four decades. Therefore, the proposed 2% increase associated with this new tax would likely have a minimal impact.

While a minimum tax on the wealthy would not resolve all issues related to tax equity, it will represent a significant component of an ideal tax system. This system should also include a highly progressive income tax and a similarly progressive inheritance tax. Ultimately, funding public goods will need to rely more heavily on a tax on wealth, alongside indirect taxation on excessive consumption in advanced societies and the harmful use of natural resources. This approach is essential to encourage a gradual reduction in income inequality, which is increasingly undermining social cohesion within our communities.

¹ The Future of European Competitiveness, September 2024
² G.B. Wolff, Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed, Bruegel, Brussels, 21 February 2025
³ G. Zucman, Global Wealth Inequality, Annual Review of Economics, 2019
⁴ A. Alstadsæter, S. Godar, P. Nicolaides, G. Zucman, Global Tax Evasion Report 2024 https://www.taxobservatory.eu/publication/global-tax-evasion-report-2024
⁵ In France, the National Assembly approved on 21 February 2025, at first reading, a bill establishing the introduction of a minimum wealth tax on taxpayers with assets exceeding 100 million euros, in order to tax them up to 2% of the value of their assets. This new tax would affect 0.01% of taxpayers, or approximately 1,800 taxpayers.

The wars just over the EU borders have brought back into focus the most demonic and evil form of power, i.e. military force. EU citizens have not been subjected to this kind of power for 80 years. Not because Italians, French, Germans and other Europeans have become pacifists or better people, but because a particular historical process has developed in this part of the world, resulting in common institutions (the European Union) that have made war between Europeans impossible, actually unthinkable. This is not common knowledge, because people believe new things only when they are well-established, as Machiavelli said. 

On February 24, 2022, a war started that aimed to change the world – for the worse. There were three basic reasons behind the Russian aggression: the determination that Ukraine should return to the “Russian world” (Russkij mir); the removal of individual EU countries from American hegemony, and the establishment of a new world order with a reduction in the importance of the West and the return of Russia to a key role in the world. ^[1]

On October 7, 2023, yet another war began in the Middle East, between two peoples and two nationalist aspirations, one that has already become a state (Israel), the other seeking statehood (Palestine/Hamas). Each claims the identical territory: the conflict has inevitably become radicalized. Each has its own system of international alliances: there is a risk that the conflict will spread to other states. 

In the area of the Pacific, the cold war between China and the United States has given rise to tensions which are even more dangerous for world peace: there, attempts are being made to set up a new world order based on two superpowers, which is dangerous, among other reasons, because it is outdated and unrealistic. Africa is troubled by endless conflicts, prey to old and new forms of imperialism, torn between various nationalist movements and in search of a difficult path to continental unity. 

In short, nationalism is rearing its head again, in Europe and the world. 

Clash of opposing principles.

We are faced with a contradiction that is even more extreme now than it was in the past. Globalisation tends to make states interdependent, economically, socially and culturally, thus uniting the world. However, the world continues to be governed by the principle according to which each state thinks of itself as ‘independent’ and fully sovereign, even for issues common to all, such as the environment, health, trade, digital, technology, social and territorial imbalances, migration etc. The term ‘sovereignty’ no longer applies in today’s world, which is interdependent in its essential needs.^[2]   A fully sovereign state inevitably belligerently seeks its own “living space” if there are no supranational institutions to govern its relations. Thus, Hitler’s lebensraum returns today in Putin’s Russkij mir, both ideologies of nation-states with an imperialist mission. This is why pacifism, in itself, is not enough, because it does not alter the (violent) nature of relations between states which think and act as if they were fully sovereign, waging war on each other as the highest expression of the sovereignty they lay claim to.^[3]

A little over two centuries ago, Kant proposed a new direction based on reason. He suggested that just as “savage man was forced to renounce his brutal freedom and seek peace and security in a legal constitution”  states need to “leave the illegal state of barbarism and enter into a federation of peoples, in which each state, even the smallest, can hope for its security and the safeguarding of its rights not from its own force or legal assessments, but only from this great federation of peoples (Völkerbund),  from collective strength and deliberations according to the laws of the common will.” ^[4]

Kant’s indications go further: without supranational federal institutions to guarantee peace among states, the fundamental values of freedom, justice and equality cannot be fully realized; not only among peoples, but also within each individual state; in war, states drastically limit the internal space for freedom and democracy.

Kant is prophetic. The destructive potential of nuclear weapons means that the problem of overcoming the division into sovereign states can no longer be regarded as a theoretical question of an enlightened mind, but must stand as the political goal of our time. To live with war involves accepting the idea of the total degradation of morality and the ultimate demise of the human species. It is this situation, then, that, according to Kant, will drive states “to do what reason…might have suggested: that is, to leave behind the illegal state of barbarism and enter into a federation of peoples.” 

Roughly the same time, on the other side of the ocean, thirteen former colonies of the British Empire were deciding whether to remain divided or to unite after the Declaration of Independence (1776). Supporters of the union reminded their citizens of how the European continent had set a bad example: the states in Europe were divided and had gone from one war to another, amidst endless atrocities and misery. And they drew the lesson from history that led them to opt for a federal union, the United States of America (Philadelphia Convention, 1787): “To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.” (Alexander Hamilton,The Federalist).  They took Kant’s teachings to heart. 

We know that this idea is at the root of the process of European unification, which was inspired by the Ventotene Manifesto (“For a free and united Europe”), and is a fundamental goal of political action in our time, as Altiero Spinelli often recalled. It is said that the “new dividing line between progress and reaction” is between those who want to move beyond the absolute sovereignty of states, sharing it in some areas, in order to “create a solid international state”; and those who, on the contrary, want to preserve absolute sovereignty, often without realizing that this claim is purely ideological, and has no solid basis in reality.

The process of European unification, initiated by the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, raised the problem of “institutionalized” peace as the starting point (A united Europe was not achieved: we had war), linking the construction of Europe to the goal of peace: “It proposes that production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of the common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have become the most constant victims.

…. .The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”  It was, therefore, at that precise moment that war became “unthinkable” in our countries, first for the Six “founding” member states and now for the Twenty-seven. Despite many flaws, this European Union has “disarmed” relations between the States. We can, therefore, say that Europe, governed by these institutions, now represents an area of “achieved peace” among its citizens. The message of Ventotene has brought European unification to life, and demonstrated that it is a constitutional process of a federal nature.

Europe and the World

What foreign policy should the European Union adopt today? The values that should inspire its action are inherent in its DNA: peace as the result of a system of supranational norms, sustainabilityas an economic-social model, and supranational democracy as the culmination of the historical development of citizenship. On what principles should a foreign policy capable of pursuing these values be based? Principles that, to be effective, must apply no longer only to Europe, but also to the world. This is a new principle that revolutionizes the traditional approach of the foreign policy of states which aim to increase the power of their own state to the detriment of others. We can, therefore, broadly formulate the following guiding principles for European foreign policy.

1) International security. The security of a state cannot be acquired by an enlargement of its sphere of influence, that is, with less security for others (I am safer if you are weaker). On the contrary, security must be mutual (I am safe if you are safe too). This principle must first be initiated in Europe, with the creation of the “common European home” (Gorbachev) as an alternative to the Putin regime’s policy of aggression. If this principle takes hold in Europe, then it can take hold elsewhere.

2) Interdependence among states. Under the system of absolute sovereignty, a state’s independence is assured by its strength. Interdependence, on the other hand, aims to enable states to find the right balance between autonomy and the achievement of common shared goals. With the ECSC, for example, interdependence between France, Germany and the other states was achieved through the creation of a High Authority that jointly managed the production and distribution of resources. So, interdependence and security for all. A similar solution could be pursued in the Middle East^[5] and for the ‘governance’ of global public goods. This will lead to the primacy of universal law over that of the individual state, just as European law has primacy in Europe.

3) Multilateralism. This is the natural development of the policy of enlargement. Europe’s borders have never been defined, because the process of unity does not aim to create a “bordered” state, but to seek shared security with neighbouring states through common supranational institutions. What we call “borders” (limes) are actually “thresholds” (limen), which allow us to imagine relations between different areas of the world as open federations. 

4) Regulatory power, that is, the EU’s capacity to produce rules. It has been doing this for seventy years, bringing together its citizens with rules in the fields of consumption, trade, transport, environmental protection, human rights etc. The EU is a “powerhouse” in this area; no other country in the world has developed a similar process. The European rules-based culture will come into its own when it becomes clear that “global public goods” cannot be governed by the force of individual states such as China, the US or others.

Based on these principles it will be possible: (a) to transform NATO into an equal partnership, a condition that would also be a guarantee (for Russia) that the end of the war in Ukraine will not result in the strengthening of American power in Europe, rather in the emergence of a truly autonomous Europe; (b) to base the “new world order” on a multilateral system with several pillars (U.S., EU, China, Russia, India, Latin America, Africa), rather than on powers vying for hegemony; (c) to reform the UN, by opening the Security Council to all major areas of the world and eliminating the power of veto in the Security Council, making way for the emergence of a world parliament.

EU foreign policy will thus be geared to reproducing the principle of federal unity, the basis of its initial political project, on a global scale.

Antonio Longo

^[1] The reference is to a text published by “La Fondation pour l’innovation politique” – Fondapol.org on 2/3/2022, entitled “La Russie n’a pas seulement défié l’Occident, elle a montré que l’ère de la domination occidentale mondiale peut être considérée comme complètement et définitivement révolue.” This is a translation of an article that appeared on 26/2/2022 in the Russian RIA Novosti news agency (later removed), under the title “Russia’s advent and the new world order.” This article describes the imperialist project conceived by Putin: the total russification of Ukraine and Belarus as the starting point of a recomposition of a new world order that would undermine the West.

^[2] Sovereignty is a  very old term that refers to the idea of a single and indivisible centre of power in a state. The global challenges of our time, however, demonstrate two things. The first is that states (not even the largest) are no longer truly “sovereign,” since they can no longer solve problems alone; they are forced to cooperate in one way or another. The second is that the “capacity to act” of states (another old definition of sovereignty) lies not so much in taking decisions (making laws etc) or making choices, but in “the ability to control the outcome of what you have decided” (as Mario Draghi says). Otherwise, you are not actually “sovereign”. Now, in the context of the enormous challenges facing humanity, this “ability to control” can only exist in a situation of maximum interdependence between states, that is, at the world (federal) level. This means that with federalism it is possible to control the use of power, this is no longer true with national sovereignty.

^[3] Because of the radical opposition of principles in the field, the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict may have two possible alternative conclusions: 1) negotiations over the partitioning of the occupied territories: in this case, it will be clear that aggression paid off in the end. This would be a victory of the principle of “absolute” state sovereignty and, a defeat of the principle of “relative” sovereignty, at the basis of European unity; 2) the implosion/defeat of the current regime in Moscow (as a result of facts unimaginable today) and the agreement by  a new Russia to become part of a security system in Europe, governed by common institutions.

^[4] Immanuel Kant,  Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, Thesis VII, 1784.

^[5] For the reasons given above, the “two peoples two states” formula reproduces the model of states which are completely sovereign (to wage war on each other), unless a strong federal constraint (a shared government for security purposes) is created. The ECSC model seems the most realistic, with the creation of a “Middle East Economic Community for Water and Energy” between Israel, Jordan and other interested countries: it would be this (institutionalized) community of interests that would guarantee peace for all states and peoples concerned, including the Palestinians.

The European debate on the new Stability and Growth Pact invests several European and global challenges at the same time. Each of these will have consequences for the others. And also for the balance of power between the “European government” and the member states.

Over the past few years an impressive series of events has hit Europe (and the whole world). After the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the European sovereign debt crisis of the first half of the 2010s, COVID struck at the end of 2019. Then came Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And after that, the energy crisis and soaring inflation. Additionally, all this happened as a new structural scenario is emerging: the environmental crisis that forces a global response; and contradictory thrusts for the search of a new world order brought about by the decline of US leadership and the emergence of new powers (China, India and others); in fact, we are facing an alternative between renewed international cooperation with shared global rules and the clash between superpowers for the global hegemony. It is not surprising that all this is prompting a rethinking of the European economic architecture. A first, historical, response has already come in the form of the Next Generation EU (NGEU), the post-pandemic Recovery Plan financed with debt jointly guaranteed by member states.

And now two other fundamental topics are up for discussion: the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP); and the development of a new European industrial policy. Put together, these areas of intervention promise to reshape the global EU economic governance.

The European Commission itself recognised that the current version of the SGP doesn’t fit the modern world. When the pandemic struck, the general escape clause of the SGP was activated, allowing member states to react to the COVID-19 crisis by providing sizable fiscal support to their economies; this strong countercyclical response proved highly effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis. The NGEU was then set up to help the various European economies to recover and to shift towards a greener and more digitised future. At the same time, the crisis resulted in a significant increase in public debt ratios, highlighting the importance of reducing them to prudent levels; indeed, fiscal prudence in times of sustained growth helps build fiscal buffers that governments can use to provide countercyclical fiscal support in times of crisis.

The time has thus come for a comprehensive reform of the SGP. The current set of rules is based on the famous Maastricht’s thresholds: a country’s debt to GDP ratio and annual deficit to GDP ratio cannot exceed, respectively, 60 per cent and 3 per cent. If the government debt is beyond such a limit, the country is required to lower its excess over the 60 per cent limit by one twentieth each year. This reduction plan, which constitutes the “corrective arm” prescribed by the SGP, is objectively too rigid since it doesn’t take into account the specific economic conditions of the country under examination. The same argument holds for the general set up of the current rules.

The reform proposed by the Commission is aimed at relaxing these parameters and, at the same time, at politically engaging the member states. Essentially, it is based on a multi-year approach. In a first moment the member states would be classified in different risk categories in accordance with a debt sustainability analysis. The Commission would then propose a reference multiannual adjustment path to the countries with substantial and moderate fiscal challenges based on the net primary expenditure, i.e. the expenditure under the direct control of the governments. The goal of the plan is to bring the public debt on a plausible and continuously declining path at the end of the 4-year period.

At this point, the member states can present a counter-proposal. It has to include a detailed description of reforms, public investments and fiscal adjustments needed to put the debt on a declining trajectory; the involved government may also request an extension of the adjustment period for three more years. Finally, the European Council would be in charge of approving or rejecting the country’s proposed plan. If rejected, and in case of no agreement between the Commission and the member state, the adjustment path initially proposed by the Commission would automatically become the reference plan. From a governance perspective, this process would increase the federal power of the Commission which supervises and coordinates the national economic plans, thus promoting converging growth and stabilisation paths and, in turn, favouring the integrity of the entire system.

The reform proposed by the Commission represents an important step in the right direction both from a purely economic point of view and for its political implications. First of all, it is based on the net primary expenditure which, as said, represents the costs under the direct control of the governments. This ensures that the country, in carrying out its adjustment path, is shielded from variables like interest rates movements (which can be due to speculative market swings or to monetary policy interventions) or higher automatic stabilisers (like unemployment and social benefits). This gives the government enough room to implement the plan independently and to focus on the actions under its direct control. Furthermore, several economists have argued in favour of stabilising the public debt by focusing on the net primary expenditure: the public debt does converge towards a steady level if the net primary expenditure is under control, provided that the economy enjoys a certain level of growth.

Another relevant merit of the proposed reform is the multi-year approach. This allows for medium and long-term planning, which is the proper time horizon in terms of public finance sustainability. The government is given a good timespan to manage the level of spending according to the chosen fiscal policy. In particular, the duration of the plan may coincide with the government term, which means it is not forced into a short term rush but it has the opportunity to manage its economic policy throughout the whole legislature. This is first of all a sound economic principle on its own. And secondly, this translates into a political stimulus: making more stable governments, a challenge particularly important for several European countries unfortunately accustomed to short-lived governments (like Italy for example).

At the same time, member states are more actively involved in the process. While in the old system they were asked to curb spending in a rigid way, now they work together with the European institutions. This method gives them full political responsibility for the actions undertaken, covering a period of several years. The Commission’s objective is therefore twofold: giving more flexibility on the economic front and more stability and responsibility on the political one.

Not only stability

Ursula von der Leyen has recently announced that the Commission will propose a new EU Sovereignty Fund next summer to support European industry’s green and digital transition. The project is at a very early phase; indeed, there is not a formal proposal yet. Nevertheless, the final objectives of the initiative are already clear: helping the economic growth with structural interventions and launching what has been defined as “strategic autonomy” i.e. a new European industrial policy. Several political leaders and pundits have already been arguing in favour of such initiatives for a long time. Then, the disruptions created by the pandemic and later by the war and energy crisis have made clear that a European intervention in this direction is really needed. Lastly, the political pressure to act has mounted as President Biden signed into law the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) with its “made in America” subsidies.

The Commission is determined to accommodate the transition and to make the European economies more resilient. It is urging the member states to shorten permitting times for green projects, to ease redtapes and to retrain workers with the new skills required. It has spoken out in favour of signing long-term agreements with countries that supply crucial raw materials in order to reduce dependence on single suppliers. Investments throughout the entire supply chain will be proposed.

However, as we are still at a very early stage, the details of the interventions are still to be defined. A first crucial point will regard financing. The most obvious choice would be the emission of Eurobonds, as already done for the Next Generation EU. This would allow the set-up of a Sovereignty Fund with enough scope to act decisively. It would also boost the creation of the capital market union and provide financial markets with more risk-free euro denominated securities. Hopefully, the likely resistance from Central and Northern European countries will be overcome (resistance that, of course, should be overcome thanks to the good usage of the funds received under the NGEU; it is reasonable, compelling indeed, to verify how the current resources are used before adding more common debt). Other, less preferable, alternatives might be direct contributions from member states or involving the European Investment Bank (EIB).

Possibly still more important will be the decisions made in terms of European industrial policy. In doing so, the EU absolutely needs to maintain the market-based approach it has always embraced. Responding to the American IRA with an indiscriminate subsidy race would make everyone worse off; on the contrary, the integration of the single market and the openness Europe has had towards the rest of the world have served the continent remarkably well. As of now, European leaders fear jobs and investments may move to America; but they also need to consider that Europe has a large, functioning and growing green industry, thus it is far-fetched for firms to abandon Europe massively. Better to use the Sovereignty Fund to invest in public infrastructures, build electricity grids, invest in renewables. Europe needs huge structural investments which cannot be sustained only by privates; that’s where the public pot should go. Of course, targeting help towards the poorer would be sensible, which is different from the sort of handouts for everyone approach some governments have pursued.

Making the EU economy more resilient will need a mix of “strategic autonomy” and diversification. The production of some essential goods might be internalised; at the same time, diversifying the supply chain will be important. Again, this is the job of a vigorous trade policy, on which the EU excels.

In short, in pursuing its industrial policy, the EU needs to build on its strengths: strong internal market, limits on subsidies, openness, multilateralism. It is worth noting that this approach makes sense from an economic point of view but also from a political one. The EU is a champion in international cooperation and often stands as a “normative power”, setting global standards for others to follow. War has erupted on European soil and geopolitical tensions are high almost everywhere. The EU is a landmark for multilateralism and should continue to act as such. Implementing a common European industrial policy is essential for the EU to thrive; at the same time, it must do it by remembering its strengths and, most of all, its ideals. The Commission has hinted into this direction; hopefully the process will follow this lead, preparing the ground for a bigger Europe into a cooperative world.

Combining stability and growth

Global public debts ballooned over the last decades. A first considerable surge happened because of the financial crisis of 2007-09. When COVID-19 struck, governments in rich countries spent freely to support their economies. They were right: they learnt from the previous crisis when public response had been too timid in helping the economies out of recession. Fiscal largess has been favoured by central banks which slashed interest rates and bought huge amounts of longer dated government bonds via their Quantitative Easing (QE) programmes. But now governments face two major problems. The first one is that it is difficult to reverse public spending. Once a bonus or tax relief has been introduced, it is politically tricky to remove it; moreover, after some time of big public support, people now come to expect the government to do the same when the next crisis hits. This is another reason to refrain from a costly subsidy race, preferring instead the sort of carbon pricing scheme the EU has successfully implemented.

The second problem is that interest rates have now been increased by central banks in the attempt to tame inflation: they reached 5-5.25% in the US, 3.25% in the Eurozone and 4.50% in the UK; only Japan has still a loose monetary stance but even there pressures to start tightening are mounting as inflation is approaching an uncomfortably high level. Costs for interest are then climbing and, as a consequence, debt levels risk becoming unmanageable.

Against this backdrop, it is important to consider the double objective the European Commission is aiming for. On the one hand, the reform of the SGP wants to lower government debt in a gradual but credible manner. This is particularly relevant at a time when several factors promise to keep pressures on already strained government budgets for a long time: the green transformation of the economy, more defence spending, the reconstruction of Ukraine, increasing health care costs linked to ageing population. On the other hand, the European industrial policy wants to create the structural conditions to help the economy grow and make it more resilient; combining growth with fiscal prudence is indeed essential for stability itself. Besides, contrary to many European governments, the Commission has fiscal space to act properly, which is why it would be reasonable to finance the Sovereignty Fund with European resources.

The process for reforming the SGP and setting up the European industrial policy has just begun. With the various legislative steps the European Parliament, Council and member states will surely have the possibility to improve the initial proposals of the Commission and make them as suitable as possible. However, at the present time, it is relevant to highlight that the direction indicated by the Commission is the right one: fiscal rules must be reintroduced as the shocks from COVID and the energy crisis give way to ordinary conditions; such rules need to be reviewed in a more flexible and, as a consequence, credible way; additionally, European intervention is needed to spur growth and accommodate the economy towards the new normal, through a bigger and sustainable EU budget.

Since it was put forward by the European Commission in May 2020, the concept of “open strategic autonomy” has become a centrepiece of the EU’s action in its internal and external dimensions. Another relevant idea is that of the “Brussels Effect”, which refers to the unique way how EU rules are capable to exert global influence. Putting the two together, the EU finds itself in the unique position to practice a mode of leadership open to anyone willing to share its values and recognising its rules, that we could call “open regulatory leadership”.

Open strategic autonomy is aimed at leading the way on the green and digital transition, to enable the EU to take a primary role in setting rules at the global level. Thanks to this, the EU will be able to win the challenge posed by alternative socio-economic models, benefitting from the first mover advantage in defining norms that can become global standards – especially in the field of digital and green technologies. What is more, the EU is not alone the global market of policy ideas. Therefore, this action becomes even more crucial not just to support the European strategy in this domain, but also as an alternative to other models that are being developed and proactively pushed by other world powers.

This short essay focuses on the intersection of these themes with digital and tech policy, an area where the EU is currently very active in setting new rules for the years to come. This is not only because this policy field was relatively less regulated than others, but also due to the strategic importance of technology in view of the dynamics that characterise the interconnected world economy. This is embodied in the concept of “technological sovereignty” (sometimes “digital sovereignty”), linked to one of the headline ambitions of the von der Leyen Commission (2019-2024), which is “A Europe fit for the digital age”.

Thus, two questions are in order. First, is the EU aware of the strategic importance of regulatory leadership in the digital field? Some of the most recent initiatives of the European Commission give a clear and positive answer to this question.

The European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, proposed by the Commission in January 2022, proclaims “the ambition that the principles serve as an inspiration for international partners to guide a digital transformation which puts people and their human rights at the centre throughout the world.”

In the Strategic Foresight Report 2021, the Commission writes that the EU is in competition for ‘first mover’ advantage in standard‑setting, particularly in emerging technologies – from Artificial Intelligence (AI) to blockchain, from quantum to digital currencies – and green technologies, such as hydrogen, energy storage, offshore wind and sustainable transport. The 2022 edition of the Report goes one step further: it makes an explicit link between the EU’s ability of setting international standards – where a more strategic approach must be developed – and the potential success of the EU’s economy to move towards an economic model of “competitive sustainability” – one that is embedded in the values of fairness and sustainability and at the same time capable of delivering economic stability and productivity.

Similarly, in the EU Strategy on Standardisation, the Commission recognises the strategic importance of norms and standard setting, it recognises that the EU is lagging behind in this field and sets out the actions to close the gap. In line with the paradigm to remain open, the way forward is identified in multilateralism and alliance with likeminded partners. A concrete example of this approach is represented by the work under the new format of Trade and Technology Council recently launched with the United States and India, as well as the newly-established Digital Partnerships with Japan and South Korea, lready planned also with Singapore.

Particular attention to cooperation in digital policy with likeminded third countries can be found, for instance, in the Note on Regulation of the EU Digital Economy drafted by the current Trio Presidency (France, Czech Republic, and Sweden). Thus, Member States, which at the moment are fundamental drivers of EU policymaking, appear to be well-aware of the opportunities and responsibilities associated with open regulatory leadership. Also in the European Parliament, the other co-legislator, the implications of the Brussels Effect come up in many debates around digital policymaking. Just to cite one example, the European Parliament’s Report on artificial intelligence in a digital age “acknowledges that establishing the world’s first regulatory framework for AI could give the EU leverage and a first-mover advantage in setting international AI standards based on fundamental rights as well as successfully exporting human-centric, ‘trustworthy AI’ around the world.”

Having acknowledged that EU institutions are aware of how crucial it is for the EU to practice open regulatory leadership, the second question to be addressed is the following: what is the EU doing to achieve it? In other words, does the “Brussels Effect” in digital policy truly exist and is it proactively used as an instrument to support the open strategic autonomy objectives?

The term “Brussels Effect” synthesises different explanations for the EU’s unique ability to influence rules in third countries. Supposedly, by virtue of its market size, regulatory capacity and stringent regulation on specific markets and targets, the EU exerts its influence both de jure – third countries emulate EU regulations domestically – and de facto – multinational companies abide by EU rules even when subject to other jurisdictions.

An article recently published by Digital Society explores the issue in relation to data protection rules, in an attempt to answer the question of why and how the EU rules global digital policy. Since the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was passed in 2016, it has been commonly defined as the “gold standard” data protection law and has become the paramount example of EU regulation in the digital field holding a truly global reach. Empirical evidence collected through qualitative interviews with 40 policymakers, stakeholders, and experts around the world shows that EU rules in data protection have a sizeable international impact. Among the several potential enablers of EU regulatory influence, the main drivers of the GDPR’s global success are the EU’s internal market appeal, its credibility as a regulator, and the timing of its regulatory actions in line with evolving policy needs.

This has empowered the EU to exert regulatory influence in a unilateral and indirect way, with private companies complying to the GDPR even when not obliged to do so and third countries freely choosing to emulate the European approach in their own system, either due to economic considerations or the desire to imitate a model that is considered good for human rights or effective to deal with technological developments. The EU has been exerting regulatory influence also in a more proactive and direct manner, via Commission decisions that enable the free flow of data whenever a third country is deemed to provide an adequate level of data protection in line with European standards.

As European legislators are now discussing how to regulate Artificial Intelligence, the Centre for the Governance of AI published a research paper that focuses on the potential for these new rules to diffuse globally and produce a “Brussels Effect” in AI policy. The authors conclude that parts of the new EU regulatory regime are likely to generate a de facto Brussels Effect, incentivising changes in products offered in non-EU countries. The paper also argues that there is a strong possibility that EU AI rules will influence regulation adopted by other jurisdictions, de jure diffusion being particularly likely for jurisdictions with significant trade relations with the EU. Furthermore, the upcoming regulation might be particularly important in offering the first and most influential operationalisation of what it means to develop and deploy trustworthy and human-centred AI.

Learning from the lessons of the GDPR, other countries have already started moving on this front in order not to be left behind. In October 2022, the United States, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy released a “Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights”, which provides a non-binding framework for how government, technology companies, and citizens can work together to ensure more accountable AI. Also China has become increasingly keen on the “ethics” of technology, with a number of initiatives on AI, data and privacy governance. It must be said that both the US and the Chinese approach to digital regulation differs, to different degrees, from the European one. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present discussion, what matters here is the simple fact that policymakers in other parts of the world address issue of tech governance adopting some of the categories (such as ethics, accountability, trustworthiness) championed by the EU.

To conclude, if the EU wants to remain a relevant actor in the multipolar world, it ought to employ all the soft power tools at its disposal. This is even more true in the digital field, as the most powerful players in digital markets are not European. In order to have success in this endeavour, it is necessary to maintain an open approach towards international likeminded partners and to meaningfully engage with market players, as they are key in the realisation of the de facto Brussels Effect.

However, we must beware of the idea that regulatory leadership alone is sufficient to achieve the objectives of open strategic autonomy. Regulatory leadership must be accompanied by – or better, fully integrated in – a truly European foreign policy, of which it can become a powerful tool (thus marking a stark difference from the classic instrument of nation states, that is military might). Moreover, while there might be appetite for regulatory solutions in response to the need of digital sovereignty also in other world regions – we can think to South America and South-East Asia and their dependence to the respective regional powers – the EU will be really able to exert open regulatory leadership only if its regulatory model is successful in practice. In other words, it is fundamental that the EU regulatory model enables the actual implementation of technological solutions. An active EU role in the development of technical standards, attention to innovation, and the meaningful engagement of industry players in the regulatory process are essential for the success of technological implementation in the European way.

Therefore, open regulatory leadership represents a decisive tool in the European policymaking on the global stage, starting from the digital sphere. Furthermore, it can be the practical application of the concept of “open federation”, presented in the opening article of this Journal (Ventotene still inspires us), which calls for making the EU a model to be followed on the path towards a world federation.

“… ensuring that the ‘power of rules’ prevail over the ‘rules of power’…”

Tanja Fajon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, 

Bled Strategic Forum, 26-30 August 2022

Introduction

As suggested by Tanja Fajon, ensuring that the power of rules prevails is the main challenge concerning the relationship between the Balkans and the EU. This challenge must be viewed against at least four critical features: the current global geopolitical challenges; the reshuffling from global to regional value-chains; the risks and opportunities deriving from the EU enlargement to the Balkans; and the need for a European structural reform.

1. The global framework

Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, since at least the US-led financial crisis, the world was in need of (and moving, slowly, towards) multilateralism, as a way to overcome the weakness of a hegemonic system no longer reflected in the real balance of economic and political power worldwide. The conflict put a halt to this process, risking a return to a new form of bilateralism, that very much resembles the doom years of the cold war. The need to provide crucial global public goods for the survival of mankind suggests that we cannot afford such trend.

We must return on the way of multilateralism.

A key responsibility for this is the birth and consolidation of a clear European actorness and sovereignty, in turn depending on the ability of Europe to provide crucial public goods such as ensuring security in the provision of energy, food, raw materials, technology, multi-layered industrial structures, etc. Generally speaking, this requires restructuring the European economy to be more self-reliant; at the same time this implies a single foreign policy and a common strategic attitude towards external partnerships (Africa, Latina America, wider Europe, post-Putin Russia, Mediterranean Basin, etc).

Hence the need to enhance the European cohesion in areas where externalities split over national boundaries, again: security, foreign policy, energy, health, major infrastructure, digital and green transition. This can be done via national coordinated action, which proved weak in times of crisis, i.e when it is most required, and with high risks of asymmetry (due to different financial health of national budgets) or with a joint budget, increased with genuine own resources and/or in deficit spending. 

2. Reshoring

One key aspect of this European sovereignty enhancing strategy requires internalizing formerly global value chains. This is an ongoing process since the covid, but should be further pursued.

Hence the economic relevance of the Balkans in the EU. The following is a series of graphs and tables illustrating the trade interchange between the Balkan countries and the EU, from both sides.

They testify of a strong interdependence in regional value chains that should be further pursued. Not in an autarchic perspective, that the EU cannot afford anyway, being extremely exposed to external provision of key raw materials, but in a strategy of greater productive autonomy.

The EU current account surplus is constant and comes from an increasing trend of both imports and exports.

Exports are mainly directed to Serbia, which has a leading role in economic terms among the Balkan countries, in particular thanks to the strong engagement of Germany and Italy.

Also from the part of the Balkans, the EU represents over 4/5th of the regional exports and accounts for more than a half of imports. Both China and Russia are currently of minor economic importance to the area. This strategic asset should not be wasted.

3. Critical features

Traditional, historical, geopolitical alliances may be a problem. Serbia’s relations with Russia may be a risk for the strategic unity of the region. But it may be turned into an opportunity. Sooner or later the conflict in Ukraine is destined to come to an end; and we cannot expect simply to ignore the existence of Russia. Some kind of reciprocal relations must be established again between the EU and Russia. In this case, previous privileged relationships with Russia of some member countries may be an opportunity as a political and economic bridge. It is a long-run perspective. But nobody can predict how short this long-run may turn out to be.

Another major risk may be diverging interests between the Balkans. It is not by chance that we use the term Balkanization to illustrate fragmentation. It is in the responsibility of the EU to single out areas where balkanization risks are minimized a strategic unity ensured.

One more risk derives from the current weakness, especially in some of these countries, to ensure the (active) protection of human, civic, social rights and common European values. We do not want more problems similar to those we are experiencing with Hungary and Poland. This will very much depend on the way collective decisions are taken and enforced. We shall return on this later.

One further issue concerning the diverging performance of these countries in economic terms, that will need to be addressed. This also implies a more active redistributive capacity of the EU budget than what it is currently. We shall return on this in the next section.

4. Deepening or enlarging?

I hope I made it clear that the sooner we allow the Balkans in the process of EU membership the better. Pending the implementation of effective powers in foreign policy, the enlargement represented (and still represents) the true, viable EU foreign policy till now, by which the EU extended the power of supranational rules to a growing number of European countries. 

Enlarging is therefore unavoidable; to stabilize democratic trends, ensure balanced growth, enhance the resilience of the whole European continent to internal and external challenges. The ADRIA Region is already providing a useful table for common projects in the fields of skills, best practices, human capital, joint investment, etc. It is not enough. Full membership should come as soon as possible.

Deepening, nevertheless, is key too. In particular, no collective decision can be left again to the blackmails of veto power. And this requires treaty changes and an ex-ante agreement, before any enlargement takes place.

A two or three tier Europe might fit for the purpose of accommodating the institutional architecture to the required compromise between enlargement and deepening. Macron’ European political community might serve for this purpose. This implies, nevertheless, that a core of European countries has the strength to increase its collective sovereignty, basically thorough founding a federal system. 

Concluding remarks

In any case, what is mostly important is that Europe provides a clear and timely signal of a radical change in its governing structure, showing that it is ready to take the opportunities and minimize the risks of inefficiency, eventually providing a convincing coherence between its decision-making system and the rhythm of history.

By Antonio Longo

The Strategic Compass aims to cement the foundations for a shared vision for EU security and defence among European Union Member States. This Member State-led process was initiated in 2020 and finalized  on end of March 2022.

This document is a schematic contribute to the debate on the “strategic compass” issue, in particular as regards to the relationship between the concepts of security and development. It has been written before the war was triggered by Russia on Ukraine. 

 Some points under discussion

1. The world faces a choice between:
   • a “global system of continent states” engaged in a struggle for hegemony or equilibrium, as was the case for the European system of states, for centuries.  From time to time one state or another (Spain, then France, and lastly Germany) would attempt to unify the continent using military power (the sword of Satan, as Spinelli called it). These attempts were always defeated thanks to the intervention of “lateral” powers (Great Britain or Russia) which, through a coalition of states, managed to restore balance in Europe. Now a similar system seems to be emerging, with a struggle for world hegemony (China/US) taking place in the economic arena, offset by military tensions in the Pacific (US/China), the Middle East (US-Russia-China), Africa (Russia-China-US-France) and Eastern Europe (Russia/US/EU);
   • a “multilateral system of states” (starting with the largest) in which the struggle for hegemony is replaced by a conscious choice to cooperate on common objectives, none of which can be achieved by any state individually: environmental protection, the health of the human species, the scientific and technological revolution, global economic development, safeguarding the values and identities of the earth’s peoples.
2. The European Union must work to ensure that the world progresses towards a “multilateral system of states”. This is in its interest, as well as its DNA (given that it was established with the aim of overcoming the absolute sovereignty of states) because:
   • The EU is an economic power, but not a military one
   • Only in a “multilateral system of states” can the EU play an important role, and make the most of its leadership in some crucial sectors, such as safeguarding the environment and health, establishing universal standards to manage the digital and technological revolution, and defending the rule of law.
3. In order to pursue a political approach that works towards a “multilateral system of states”, the European Union must decide on the guiding principles of its policy towards the rest of the world, starting with the neighbouring areas (Eastern Europe / Middle-East and Mediterranean / Africa).
   Once these strategic decisions are in place the EU will be able to determine its relations with the US, Russia and China.
4. When it comes to the neighbouring areas, the EU faces two major issues:
   • Security:
     • Russia is not secure because the breakdown of the USSR weakened it politically and it now feels squeezed between two superpowers (China/US). After abandoning Gorbachev’s plan for a “common European home”, Russia is intent on achieving security using power politics to weaken and divide the EU, applying the political paradigm of the past (that of the old European system of states). Russia’s insecurity also spells insecurity for Europe, in terms of pressure on Ukraine and the potential destabilization of the Balkans (Serbia).
     • the Middle East is insecure: the old confrontation between the US and Russia has now been replaced by a direct confrontation between “regional” powers: Iran, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt … which are reproducing a check and balance system similar to that in place in Europe in the past. This insecurity has repercussions on Europe, in the form of uncontrolled migration, religious radicalization, terrorism, the nuclear threat.
     • Africa is insecure because it is politically divided and therefore open to hegemonic interference from the superpowers (China / Russia / US) and pressures from some of the old European states (France, Italy, the UK…). This scenario will continue until the African Union takes shape by establishing an “African common market”, as Europe did in the 1950s. Insecurity in Africa affects Europe in terms of uncontrolled migration, internal destabilization, terrorism, and geo-political changes that serve specific superpowers.
   • Development
     • Russia is economically weak (its GDP is lower than Italy’s), and the fact that its exports depend essentially on gas makes it vulnerable. The free trade area with the other countries of the “Commonwealth of Independent States” (established after the demise of the USSR) has never functioned fully and a genuine “common market” has never developed. The energy transition towards carbon neutrality appears challenging: the economy is still driven by large, state-run production structures, under political control: in this scenario the economic relationship with the West automatically becomes a political issue (see Stream 2)
     • The Middle East has to face the end of oil, the resource that ensured the area’s importance for a century, as well as its development (and wars). The energy transition of this region can only be accomplished by creating a “common market” for some common goods (water, agriculture, renewable resources), accompanied by the creation of “federal-type unions” (Israeli-Palestinian?). Otherwise we can expect to see enduring instability and development gaps between different areas.
     • Africa is potentially very rich in natural resources. To drive development there needs to be unity, otherwise the continent will continue to be plundered. The main aspects to work on are: supplying energy and electricity to help combat poverty, the water issue, developing sustainable agriculture, and major infrastructure and communication projects to unite this huge continent. These issues have to be resolved for “common market” of the African Union to take off. The EU’s role in fostering this is crucial. Europe has an interest in a Euro-African energy transition, to be pursued through complementary strategies for the reduction of CO2 emissions, the development of renewable energies, infrastructures for the production and transport of hydrogen and more. There is no shortage of projects, but there must be political will on both sides of the Mediterranean.

The EU’s security policy (foreign and defence) therefore revolves around two key concepts: security and development.
Europe will be secure internally if it can help the neighbouring areas develop.
Europe will develop internally if the neighbouring areas are secure.
The neighbouring areas will be secure if Europe aids their development
Neighbouring areas will develop if Europe helps ensure their security

Brief considerations on global relations

If the world progresses towards a US/China bipolar scenario, Europe will be relegated to the role of the US’s junior partner, just as Russia can only play the role of China’s junior partner.

Europe and Russia, on the other hand, have a common interest in developing a “multipolar” global system based on US-China-Europe-Russia (potentially adding Japan, India and, in the future, the African Union and the Latin American Union) capable of orienting the global political system towards forms of global supranational unity, the only approach which is fit to tackle the challenges of the future.

The developments in the following relationships are important:

1. US – EU. The Atlantic Pact and NATO are not in question, but the relationship between the US and European countries needs to be redefined. The US needs to recognize that for NATO to be a strong Alliance there has to be a genuine equal partnership between the US and the EU (an EU with defence capabilities). We should no longer be thinking in terms of “the US and its European allies“, but the US and the EU. Europe needs this to be able to act, on its own initiative, towards Russia, China, the Middle East, Africa and the rest of the world. For multilateralism to develop the EU must have an autonomous role within the framework of Atlantic collaboration.
2. EU-Russia. Europe must be able to offer Russia security and development, and receive security and development in return. An autonomous EU (within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance) would be able to negotiate with Russia on Ukraine joining the EU (not NATO), and offer Russia free-trade agreements for goods and services, free movement of people and capital. As a member of the EU (but not NATO, like Finland or Sweden) Ukraine could also be part of a reformed Commonwealth of Independent States, working in the direction of a common market in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Ukraine should act as a “bridge” between the EU and Russia, within the framework of a “common European home”.

This is a prerequisite for ensuring that the EU and Russia become equal, rather than junior, partners of the US and China.

To this end, the EU needs to redefine its institutions:

1. It is time to move beyond direct contact between individual countries (France, Germany, Italy….) and Russia, and “Normandy format” talks
2. Foreign policy must be decided by the European Council, not the current President of the EU
3. Foreign policy should be implemented by the High Representative, given a more centralized coordinating role, in strict connection with the President of the European Commission
4. Once the terms of a potential agreement have been defined with Russia, there will have to be negotiations
5. It will be necessary to appoint a single negotiator, as was the case with Brexit. Angela Merkel could be the negotiator of the EU-Russia agreement on the status of Ukraine in the EU and the Commonwealth of Independent States. This would be a “bridge” creating a vast free trade area from the Atlantic to Vladivostok.

An area of security and development. Which makes the multilateral system possible on a global scale.

February 14, 2022

It is glaringly evident that strategic objectives and clear guidelines for a European foreign and security policy urgently need to be formulated.
The European Union is committed to defining its role and taking action for a new “world order”, focusing on the development of multilateralism as the best way to govern global public goods.
Europe’s neighbouring areas represent the most immediate test for a truly European foreign policy.
This Appeal, starting from Italy, sets out to contribute with opinions and proposals to a broad debate on these issues in Europe.
It has been sent to the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission and to the High Representative for Foreign Policy and European Security.

The Appeal

The pandemic has hit Europe and the rest of the world hard, making it glaringly evident that we urgently need to transform the economy and our way of life if they are to remain compatible, in the long term, with Planet Earth.

The world needs a new political order, based on the creation of global supranational institutions to protect global public goods, above all health and the environment.

Multilateral, cooperative policies between states are required, starting with the USA, China and Russia, in order to overcome the power politics that have always characterized relations between them.

Europe, which came into being based on the very idea of moving past the absolute sovereignty of states, can and must accept its own responsibilities in building this new ‘world order’: relations between states must be based on universally recognized law; democracy and the human rights of freedom and equality must be pursued – as well as affirmed – as universal values.

These are the basic conditions that must be met for the individual to be considered an
“autonomous centre of life”, as was written in the “Ventotene Manifesto” eighty years ago.

The European Union can no longer put off formulating its own foreign policy based on these principles, establishing its own strategic autonomy within the framework of a renewed Atlantic Alliance (as an equal partnership).

This has been highlighted by recent events in Afghanistan, which have pointed up the irreversible crisis of the United States in the role of “government of the West”.

It is also dictated by the need to forge a new relationship with Russia based on détente and
cooperation, inspired by the perspective of the “Common European Home” indicated by
Gorbachev in his day.

Europe must equip itself with its own defence force: it urgently needs military troops capable of rapid intervention to defend European territory and intervene abroad in the defence of human rights, “for peace keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter” (Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union).

This new European military force could be based on the present Eurocorps, and incorporated into the existing Treaties. It should operate under the control of a European Council acting as “European Security Council”, comprising the states supplying personnel and resources.

In recent times, European institutions have been driving change, gradually enabling the European Union to provide a coordinated, common response, both to emergencies and for health security, and in economic and social terms. In the space of a few months the Recovery Plan for Europe introduced the Union’s first form of fiscal capacity, issuing European bonds to finance the green energy and digital transition of the economy, and social and territorial cohesion, in an increasingly federal union.

To consolidate the change that has taken place and launch a genuine common foreign and
security policy, it is now imperative to outline Europe’s role in neighbouring areas in more detail.

The content of European foreign policy is determined by its response to real issues.

There are three main challenges facing the European institutions in the short term.

1) A single policy for the Mediterranean area.

The Mediterranean sea is the dumping ground for the tensions and unsolved problems in Africa and the Middle East. The Union can no longer stand by in the face of the democratic power vacuum in North Africa (and sub-Saharan Africa), which condemns these countries to underdevelopment, resource grabbing and uncontrollable migration, making them hubs of illicit traffic, and home to corrupt systems of power and endless internal wars. This situation prevents these areas from initiating a process of sustainable development and energy transition, which is the only way to change the economy and life of these countries.
To this end, the European Union must:

• Identify a clear common strategy (at least among the EU governments interested, and as a continuation of the approach formulated at the Berlin Conference on Libya, of January 2020 and  June 2021) towards the countries of North Africa, to help them achieve political stability in the context of a democratic process, also guaranteed by the UN;
• present a coordinated energy transition plan to the countries of North Africa – as the basis of a Plan between the European Union and the African Union. This should be based on the pan-African management of public goods (water, alternative energies, agriculture), the shared construction of material infrastructures (energy networks, port and airport systems) and the development of cultural and technological partnerships (universities, research centres) to launch forms of sustainable economic integration between the two of the Mediterranean, also capitalizing on existing city networks (e.g. medCities).

An outlook of this kind would also benefit the southern regions of the Union, a natural “bridge” between Europe and Africa, thanks also to the use of NextGenEU resources.

1. EU accession for the Western Balkans

The peoples of the Western Balkans are an integral part of European history and culture. For them, joining the Union would be a way to move beyond their disastrous experience of the nation-state, and the tragic divisions, war and currents of nationalism that they experienced in the 1990s.

The decision to embrace a common destiny, with shared rights and duties, has the same meaning for them now as it had for those European states which, after two horrific world wars, decided to change the course of events by initiating a process of unity.

For the Union, the inclusion of the Western Balkans is motivated by clear political/strategic reasons, rather than economic considerations. By broadening the reach of its governance to unstable areas of Europe, the Union will play a more significant role in the dialogue with the US, Russia and China when it comes to drawing up global rules to govern relations between states.

For the Western Balkans, belonging to the Union will guarantee a security they would otherwise not be able to have. Being part of the European Green Deal project would enable these countries to make a qualitative leap in their economic and social development, in common with other European peoples.

The policy of enlargement has always had the effect of strengthening the European institutions, as happened when the Eastern Europe countries joined the Union: the Treaty of Lisbon heralded great institutional progress, strengthening the powers of the Parliament and the Commission. Enlarging the Union is a clear sign of its successful vocation to unite peoples, changing relations between states and bringing them into the arena of law rather than force: this is the essence of a federal process.

The Council has already decided (March 2020) to start accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia and the Commission has already presented (July 2020) the draft negotiating frameworks to the Member States – the first to take into account the ‘revised methodology for enlargement to the Western Balkans”. The negotiations must be based on countries committing to respect the principles of the “rule of law”.

The process of enlargement to the Western Balkans. including Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, must be restarted soon, so it can be successfully completed before the next European elections in 2024, thus enabling these countries to be part of the European constitutional process.

2. Peace in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian question

The Middle East continues to be the area in which global disorder generates the most serious crises. Over time, conflicts between superpowers have also led to conflicts between “regional” powers for the control of an area crucial to a global economy whose growth is fuelled by oil.

A radical change is needed, with a new path to offer security and development to this part of the world: cooperation must replace conflict, and the rule of law must prevail over force, exactly as happened with the process of European unification seventy years ago, which transformed relations between European states after centuries of war.

Only in this context will European action to rescue and welcome Afghan refugees become the first step in a new course, based on sustainable economic development in both environmental and social terms: alternative energies and new technologies, water and agriculture represent the main challenges.

The economic unification of the Middle East market represents the framework in which this transformation process is conceivable.

The point to leverage is the pacification between Israelis and Palestinians, as demanded by the new generations of the various communities. It is possible for them to coexist under a common democratic entity: a federation between the six Israeli provinces and the territories of the West Bank and Gaza is the only prospect/set-up capable of guaranteeing rights and security to the various communities, sanctioned by a Constituent Assembly.

The European Union is the only credible guarantor of this constitutional process, because its DNA is based on overcoming division and war.  And its economic and commercial might can help generate a new process of economic development for the entire area.

As exponents of European civil society and culture, members of federalist, pro-European, environmental and civil rights movements and political forces inspired by the values of democracy, freedom and social justice, we ask that:

• The European Parliament launch a major debate on the role of the Union in the world, setting out guidelines for a European foreign policy.
• The European Council indicate the strategic base for the Union’s foreign policy action, then let the Council decide by qualified majority how to implement it.
• the European Commission and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy initiate the consequent foreign policy actions, rendering them enforceable and bearing political responsibility for them.
• the Conference on the Future of Europe initiate an in-depth discussion on the strategic lines of the European Union’s foreign policy.

September 30, 2021

First Signatories

Antonio Longo – Editor of The Ventotene Lighthouse – A Federalist Journal for World Citizenship – www.theventotenelighthouse.eu

Piergiorgio Grossi – Movimento Federalista Europeo, President of the Liguria Regional Council

Antonio Padoa–Schioppa – Jurist, historian, academic, University of Milan

Alessandro Cavalli – Sociologist – University of Pavia

Franco Praussello – Economist,University of Genoa

Roberto Palea – Former President of the Centre for Studies on Federalism

Fabio Masini – Economist – University of Roma-Tre

Davide Emanuele Jannace – Editor-in-chief of the webzine Eurobull www.Eurobull.it  

Roberta De Monticelli – Philosopher, San Raffaele University, Milan

Lucio Levi – Editor of the review The Federalist Debate https://www.federalist-debate.org/

Domenico Moro – Board of Centre for Studies on Federalism, Turin

Paolo Ponzano – Teacher of European Governance at the European College of Pavia

Luigi Giussani – Former World Federalist Movement Council Member

Stefano Dell’Acqua – PhD University of Pavia

Michele Sabatino – Economist Kore University of Enna

On August 9th, the IPCC Report (UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) was published. This report updated to 2020 is based on 14,000 studies carried out by experts from 195 countries. Within the 4,000-page report, the panel’s scientists analytically illustrate the climatic consequences in different geographical areas of the world due to CO2 and other greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere through human activity (which add to the stock of existing gases and will persist in the atmosphere for hundreds or thousands of years).

The IPCC then illustrates the different scenarios that could arise if the increase in the Earth’s average temperature is not limited to 1.5°C, within 10 or 20 years as agreed in the 2015 Paris Agreement. The latter was ratified and entered into force by 196 States, including all the main polluters, namely, the European Union (EU), the United States, Russia, South Korea, India and China (which, however, managed to postpone from 2050 to 2060 the target of achieving net zero climate-altering emissions).

The IPCC warns that global warming is occurring much faster than in the past, with the global average temperature having already risen by 1.09°C compared to the pre-industrial era. The Report describes the consequences of this rise in temperature as far worse than those predicted in previous Reports: the areas subject to fire risk have increased by 75% since the year 2000; ice sheets are losing 8 billion tons of water a day, thus accelerating the sea level rise; in many countries the temperature has reached above 35°C and up to 50°C, for example in Morocco and Canada, for prolonged periods; increasingly violent typhoons and hurricanes have hit not only the Northern Regions, but also those of the South and East of the world, often followed by severe droughts; and desertification is increasing in Africa and in some areas of Southeast Asia.

According to the Report, even if commitments to reduce emissions (Nationally Determined Contributions – NDC) were to be confirmed and implemented by all current governments, global warming would still be limited to 2.1°C by 2030/2040, thus causing increasingly prolonged periods of extreme heat, a further acceleration of both the melting of glaciers and the sea level rise and the frequency and intensity of ‘extreme events’, resulting in mass migrations. Hence the UN Secretary-General António Guterres is not wrong in stating that the new IPCC report is a “code red” for humanity.

Once again, the EU and its Commission must be acknowledged for continuing to honour the Agreements signed in Paris (through the European Green Deal and Next Generation EU), by increasing the EU’s decarbonisation target from 40% to 55% by 2030, and making it an internationally recognised world leader in tackling global warming. An important agreement between the EU and the United States, represented by President Biden, was thus possible. This new-found transatlantic agreement has multilateral commitments and shared ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) objectives.

Linked to this agreement is Biden’s executive order on the production and sale of electric, hydrogen or hybrid vehicles by 2030, with a USD 1000 billion investment, as well as the presentation to the Senate of a USD 3,500 billion anti-poverty plan to support social and environmental programmes, with cost increases and tax benefits.

The EU’s driving force has targeted not only other states but also private companies, private and public foundations and independent NGOs, which have declared their willingness to commit to achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

After the new IPCC Report and its alarming statements about the fate of humanity, I believe that the EU’s responsibilities to the world have increased considerably. Therefore, we should ask it to “raise the bar even further” in order to maintain its leading role in the fight against climate change.

We must demand that the European Union:

– apply consistent carbon pricing within the EU and in relations with the rest of the world;

– increase the production of renewable energies not only in Europe but also in Africa, with appropriate international agreements;

– establish an agreement with the African Union to produce green hydrogen through photovoltaic energy in the countries on the South-Eastern coast of Africa that would be transported to Europe using the existing gas pipelines between the two shores of the Mediterranean;

– speed up the implementation of decisive measures in areas where there is a significant delay, such as transport and electric or hydrogen mobility (electric car, electric or hydrogen-powered public transport) and the green conversion of private and public real estate assets (insulation of buildings, use of roofs for photovoltaic production, electrification and digitalisation of all utilities).

Finally, the time has come to spend the EU’s large credit and sign a new pact among the main polluting states – possibly involving private companies, private and public foundations as well as NGOs – to give life to that multilateral, supranational institution in the energy and environment sector, which federalists have been demanding for decades. The “World Organisation for Energy and the Environment”, governed by an independent High Authority (based on the ECSC model in the European unification process), would operate under the control of the UN, with the task of managing the complex and constantly evolving climatic and environmental balances in the interest of humanity.

This new organisation should endow the already existing Green Fund with USD 100 billion and propose to generalise carbon pricing globally, at least among the countries that agree with it.

In short, the EU multilateral initiative must meet the challenge of the IPCC with the aim of stabilising global climate in the best way possible so that the planet will be livable for the human species.